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Abstract
Supply chain management is critically dependent
on trusted email mechanisms that address forgery,
confidentiality, and sender authenticity. The IETF
protocol ‘Domain Authentication of Named Entities’
(DANE) described in this paper has been extended
from its initial goal of providing TLS web site
validation to also offer a foundation for globally
scalable and interoperable email security. Widespread
deployment of DANE will require more than raw
technology standards, however. Workflow automation
mechanisms will need to emerge in order to simplify
the publishing and retrieval of cryptographic
credentials that are applicable for general audiences.
Security policy enforcement will also need to be
addressed. This paper gives a descriptive tutorial of
trusted email technologies, shows how DANE solves
key distribution logistics, and then suggests desirable
automation components that could accelerate
deployment of DANE-based trusted email. Pilot
deployments are briefly described.

1. Introduction
Email is one of the most critical communication
tools used in supply chain management. It is relied
upon for a wide range of messages: partner-to-partner,
customer-to-vendor, order processing and billing, and
everyday intra- and inter-company communications.
The inconvenient truth, however, is that email as
typically used today cannot be relied upon.
It is difficult to tell if an email is fraudulent. An
original email message can be modified by a man-inthe-middle attack; for example, to alter a bank routing
number used for electronic payments. Phishing and
spear phishing attacks are common and have become
extremely sophisticated. Attackers are able to
manipulate organizations for financial gain, espionage,
or to launch malware.
Email is the preferred channel for launching
targeted cyber attacks. Email is the weak link in
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government and enterprise security; it is hard to protect
because email is not secure and is subject to social
engineering. There are numerous examples of the
abuse of email. A sampling of reports sorted from 2011
to 2016 shows a growing trend to targeted spear
phishing:
• The 2011 OMB Report to Congress cites US
CERT (The United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team) reporting 51.2% of 107,655
incidents reported by public agencies were
phishing [1, 2].
• The Cisco1 2011 Security White Paper Email
Attacks: This Time It’s Personal illustrates the
economic gain for attackers in moving away from
mass attack phishing to targeted spear phishing
attacks. In just one year the cyber criminal
monetary benefit rose from $50 million to $150
million [3].
• Trend Labs 2012 Research Paper Spear-Phishing
Email: Most Favored APT Attack Bait indicates
that 65% of incidents were targeted to
Government [4].
• The 2016 Verizon Data Breach Investigation
Report states that 30% of phishing messages
were opened by targets and 12% went on to click
malicious attachments. The majority of phishing
cases are used as a means to install persistent
malware. Cyber-Espionage was found in 68
examples of phishing/social engineering attacks
[5].
• As a specific example, Arrow Electronics, a
major distributor, revealed that they were the
victims of a $13 million theft in early 2016 based
on a combination of social engineering and spear

1

Certain commercial equipment, instruments, or materials
(or suppliers, or software,...) are identified in this paper to
foster understanding. Such identification does not imply
recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology, nor does it imply that the
materials or equipment identified are necessarily the best
available for the purpose.

2896

phishing in which an executive was impersonated
[6].
Various approaches have been used to mitigate
these problems. Application firewalls, Bayesian spam
filters, email gateways and portals are common
examples. The core solution, however, is to employ the
inherent trust mechanisms contained in the email
protocol itself. Email should be automatically
encrypted and digitally signed to ensure message
integrity and sender authentication to eliminate spear
phishing attacks.
Trust mechanisms for email have existed for
decades, but unfortunately these remain mostly unused
or misunderstood. Barriers to use include the lack of a
globally scalable publishing & retrieval mechanism for
end-user cryptographic certificates and the complexity
of current email security solutions. Ease-of-use is a
common objection from anyone who has set up or
renewed personal email certificates in laptops and
mobile devices. Automated policy enforcement is also
lacking.
Extensions to the DNS-based DANE protocol have
been published [7, 8, 9] to address improvements for
email security. In a nutshell, these DANE extensions
use the existing infrastructure of DNS and DNSSEC to
create a secure global repository of end-user X.509
certificates and the cryptographic credentials that
authenticate email servers.
By itself, however, it would be unlikely for DANE
to be widely deployed for the same reasons that
S/MIME is not widely used; the lack of simple-to-use
end-user solutions.
The current email security
ecosystem has multiple interdependent components
that involve PKI certificate authorities, DNS
provisioning systems, email host servers, and email
client programs that run in a variety of end-user
devices such as laptops, tablets and smartphones.
Consumers today are used to a world where entire
solutions are available by simply “downloading an
app”, not by having to integrate pieces from multiple
sources using a complicated set of installation
instructions from a variety of vendors.
The benefits of DANE will not be realized without
catalyzing its technology within a broader approach for
ease-of-use. Due to email’s history, evolution, and the
wide variety of vendors, it is also unlikely that there
will be a day-one event in which all components are
simultaneously interrelated.
This paper suggests methods to overcome these
usage barriers via an incremental approach towards
ease of use. We advocate automation techniques to
manage the provisioning, maintenance and policy
directives for credentials. Each step is useful in its
own right; combined together they bring us closer to a
more complete and deployable solution for end

consumers.
We also describe current pilot
implementations of DANE email extensions and
proposed international government mandates.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 gives background regarding basic email
security mechanisms. Section 3 describes the IETF
DANE email extensions. Section 4 suggests
components for automation and ease-of-use that would
enable wider deployment of DANE. Section 5
concludes the paper.

2. Background and Related Work
2.1. S/MIME and OpenPGP:
Use and Limitations
The email protocol [10] is over 30 years old and
was originally restricted to text-only messages. It was
later enriched with Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) for attaching files, formatted text,
HTML audio, video, applications and graphics [11, 12,
13]. This extended its usefulness beyond measure.
Trust mechanisms for confidentiality, authentication
and data integrity were addressed by extending email
with Secure/MIME (S/MIME) [14, 15] and with an
alternative method, OpenPGP for MIME [16]. Both
S/MIME and OpenPGP use public key cryptography to
digitally sign and encrypt email messages.
Public Key Cryptography is a method in which an
email user generates a public/private key-pair that is
either signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) or
encoded into a self-signed certificate. The added value
the CA brings is that it is a third party that is vouching
for some portion of the identity metadata stored in the
certificate along with the public key. The public key
certificate is meant to be globally available to anyone
so that they may use S/MIME to encrypt email. The
private key, held only by the email recipient, is used to
decrypt these messages. The private key is also used to
generate digital signatures for email. Since only the
sender has the private key, this mechanism ensures
authenticity of the email sender and additionally
ensures that no changes were made to the message
(data integrity). Fraudulent email will not be able to be
signed.
Unfortunately, use of S/MIME today is spotty at
best. The trust mechanism is cryptographically sound,
but operational issues have stalled its use. These
include:
• Creation of user key-pairs and installation of
private keys onto multiple devices.
• Global Distribution of public key certificates.
• Lack of a name-space to authenticate public key
certificates
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• Resisting spammer techniques such as ”cousin
domains”
• Lack of enforced policy and feedback
mechanisms
The manual steps involved in generating and
installing personal cryptographic keys can be difficult
and time-consuming, therefore most users simply don’t
do it. Furthermore, users have multiple devices and
multiple email identities. Transporting private keys
from a laptop to a smartphone or tablet is a possible but
confusing process. The end result: no keys, no trusted
email, increased risk.
Assuming a user has mastered the art of key
installation and management, the next step is to
distribute the public key certificates. Unfortunately,
there is no global key repository in which one can
publish and retrieve the public key of an individual.
Instead, it is usually done by S/MIME users manually
distributing keys to desired recipients by sending them
a digitally signed email. OpenPGP distributes keys
using a web of trust via ”key-exchange parties” and a
limited set of well-known key exchange servers.
Neither S/MIME nor OpenPGP scale well and this
limits use. A vendor cannot send encrypted email to a
customer for whom the key is unknown.
Another operational problem is the existence of
fraudulent certificates. It is possible for rogue CAs to
generate fake server or email certificates. Recipients
don’t normally examine email certificates to see if they
are correct. They assume that if a certificate exists, it
must be valid. To avoid using malicious credentials, it
is desirable to link the authorized certificates into a
global managed name space such as the Domain Name
System (DNS). This is described further in the next
section.
Related to fake certificates is the use of “cousin
domains”, defined by Steve Crocker as “a registered
domain name that is deceptively similar to a target
domain name. The target domain is familiar to many
end-users, and therefore imparts a degree of trust. The
deceptive similarity can trick the user by embedding
the essential parts of the target name, in a new string,
or it can use some variant of the target name, such as
replacing ’i’ with ’1’.” As an example, an email from
someone@examp1e.net (using a “one” character
instead of the letter “l”) might easily be mistaken for
the legitimate someone@example.net even if
digitally signed by the fraudulent domain owner.
S/MIME by itself has no policy directives or
feedback mechanisms. Automated policy enforcement
could tighten the controls on acceptance or rejection of
emails and provide feedback on failure mechanisms. A
simple example would be to create a mailbox for a user
that only accepts digitally signed email. All others (e.g.
spear phishing messages) would be rejected. Another

policy could be to enforce sender signing and
encryption.
Sections 3 and 4 will describe methods to overcome
these obstacles to make trusted email pervasive.

2.2. SPF, DKIM and DMARC
Because of the enormous growth in spam and
phishing, various methods have been developed to
limit their propagation. All of these methods use the
DNS to publish and retrieve IETF standard records that
dictate policy to an email server. Organizations such as
the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) and the
Mobile, Messaging and Mail Anti-Abuse Working
Group (M3AAWG) have encouraged their adoption.
Although very useful in the context of spam, note that
these do not constitute a full trust model for email.
However they do complement S/MIME and DANE
and would be incorporated in a comprehensive email
solution. They are described here for completeness.
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) [17, 18] is a
simple method to detect email spoofing by letting a
sending domain identify and assert the authorized mail
senders for a given domain. SPF removes guesswork as
to the authenticity of a sending email server. This
benefits receivers by allowing greater accuracy in
quarantining and blocking.
DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) [19] is a
method to detect email spoofing by checking whether
incoming mail from a domain has ben actually sent
from that domain. Authorized sending email servers
cryptographically sign all email headers (and email
bodies) with the domain’s private key. This signature
allows the receiver to verify that email purported to
come form a specific domain is authorized by the
owner of the domain. It also allows verification as to
whether headers or the message body was tampered
with after it left the sending email server. The private
key used to generate signatures is common to all email
messages from that server. This means that DKIM
does not offer true end-to-end digital signing, as the
sending MTA generates the DKIM signature, not the
original sender of the message. Verification is carried
out at the receiving MTA using the domain’s public
key that is published in the DNS.
A problem with SPF and DKIM is the lack of
feedback regarding its effectiveness. How many emails
were blocked? Were mistakes made in setting policies
or have all authorized senders been accounted for? Can
a domain test the effectiveness of DKIM before fully
turning it on?
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting,
and Conformance (DMARC) [20] was defined to
address these issues. DMARC was conceived to allow
email senders to specify policy on how their mail
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should be handled, the types of reports that receivers
can send back and the frequency of reports. DMARC
allows domain owners to know the extent to which
unauthorized senders are using their domain.

2.3. Proprietary Systems
A number of commercial and open source products
have been created to fill the void in email security.
These can be appliances or cloud-based SaaS
(Software as a Service). Systems include firewall
products from FireEye, Cisco, SonicWall and others.
SpamHaus, Sophos and Barracuda produce real-time
query systems to determine if email is coming from a
non-trusted source. AntiSpam protection and email
security gateways are available from MXLogic
(acquired by Intel), TrendMicro, FortiNet and others.
Proprietary email encryption products have been
created due to the S/MIME limitations outlined earlier.
Zix and ProofPoint are example products used by
companies that need a fully functional email
encryption solution. These are closed systems,
however, and all parties have to use the same solution
environment. Typically used in the financial sector,
these proprietary solutions can be complex, and are
neither universally available across diverse groups nor
interoperable due to their walled-garden nature.

3. DANE
Supply Chain Management is a global process. Its
diverse community of suppliers, customers and
integrators typically use differing processes and
systems. Interoperability of trusted email across this
community is an absolute requirement. Proprietary
solutions are inadequate due to their closed nature. A
standards-based approach to trusted email, on the other
hand, achieves universality and interoperability.
This leads to using standard S/MIME; it already
exists and is available across all mail servers and
clients. In fact, S/MIME can be and is used today, but
the challenge in managing key distribution makes
global scaling difficult. This limitation can be
overcome, however, by means of the DANE protocol.
DANE uses the global DNS infrastructure to overcome
key distribution issues. It also solves problems in
securing communication between mail exchange
servers. Its use of the existing DNS infrastructure
implies that solutions are readily deployable and
affordable.

3.1. The DANE Mechanism
DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities
(DANE, RFC6698) [7, 8] is a mechanism used to bind
X.509 certificates into the DNS. The records are made
cryptographically secure via the DNSSEC security
extensions [21, 22, 23]. DANE can be used to store
self-signed certificates, or to authorize specific X.509
certificates from a registered CA. It does this by
publishing the X.509 certificate (or fingerprint thereof)
in the appropriate specialized DANE resource record
according to its usage: TLSA for certificates used to
support TLS in applications, OPENGPGKEY or
SMIMEA to support OpenPGP and S/MIME
respectively.
One motivation for creating DANE was to solve
issues with the existing X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI). DANE, for example, addresses
rejection of fraudulent certificates, permits simpler
handling of certificate revocation, creates a mechanism
for global publishing and retrieval of certificates, and
allows the authorization of self-signed certificates.
DANE achieves these goals by using the delegation
property of the DNS name space, meaning that only
authorized domain owners can place records in their
DNS domain. As an example, only the “example.com”
corporation can place records in the example.com
DNS name space. No one else can do so because they
do not have access to the delegation. Delegation
enables the creation of an authorization mechanism.
The first application of the DANE protocol was for
the authentication of TLS certificates used by web
servers. Consider a web site www.example.com.
Assume that multiple certificates exist for that site, a
real one and several fraudulent ones used by attackers
for man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM). How can
www.example.com protect itself? The solution is
for the domain owner to insert a DANE TLSA record
in the www.example.com DNS namespace to
authorize only the genuine certificate. Web clients that
retrieve certificates from a server can also retrieve the
DANE record and match it against the certificate. If the
DANE record exists and matches, the certificate is
authorized and the connection is accepted. If the record
does not match, the certificate is rejected and the
connection is denied.
The DANE protocol is meant to be generic and
multi-purpose. Application-specific use of DANE is
defined in separate RFCs. Email usage is defined in
two documents: RFC 7672 [24] defines TLSA records
to secure the SMTP protocol for email servers, and an
IETF draft document [9] defines SMIMEA records to
secure end-user email certificates. We will explore
each of these in turn.
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3.2. DANE for MTA-MTA Security
A simplified email architecture is illustrated in
figure 1. Email clients are programs such as Outlook,
Apple Mail or Thunderbird that run in user devices
(smartphones, tablets, laptops) to compose, send and
retrieve email. Email is sent from these clients to Mail
Transfer Agents (MTA) that store and forward the
messages among themselves and finally to the recipient
email client.
Mail Server
(MSA / MTA)

Mail Server
(MSA / MTA)

“STARTTLS”

User mail client

DNS w DANE records

presence of a TLSA record permits incremental
deployment of this DANE security mechanism.
DANE therefore achieves two goals for MTAs: it
authenticates the receiver (certificate match), and
enforces confidentiality via encryption between MTAs.
Several email servers have already been modified to
take advantage of this capability, including the popular
open-source Postfix server.
3.2.1 Current Deployment of MTA-MTA Security
Using DANE
The use of DANE for SMTP was specified in 2015
so deployment has been sparse as developers add the
functionality to their implementations. There has been
a sizable deployment within Germany and some
experiences have been documented [25]. Using TLSA
RRs to publish certificate information has been called
out by the German Federal Office of Information
Security as mandated for deployment as part of the
“Email Made in Germany” initiative [26].

User mail client

3.3. DANE for End-User Email Security
Figure 1: Simplified Email Architecture
Mail Transfer Agents will encrypt data sent from
one MTA to another if TLS is available. This is a
privacy measure for data-in-motion only. Once
transferred, the data-at-rest is in plaintext.
Unfortunately, The original SMTP protocol did not
accommodate TLS. To fix this, a new command,
STARTTLS, was added to the protocol. STARTTLS
modifies an existing insecure connection and upgrades
it to a secure connection using SSL/TLS. The
STARTTLS implementation, however, employs
opportunistic TLS; that is, the receiving server can
refuse the command and data communications between
the two servers will continue in plaintext.
Opportunistic TLS creates vulnerability. An
attacker can use a man-in-the-middle downgrade attack
by simplify refusing the STARTTLS request. This
allows eavesdropping and potential message
modification by an attacker.
DANE eliminates this vulnerability as illustrated by
the block diagram in figure 1. Before issuing a
STARTTLS, the sending mail server will query the
DNS for the DANE TLSA record associated with the
receiving server. If a record exists, STARTTLS
becomes mandatory. If a server refuses the STARTTLS
request or if the certificate does not match the DANE
TLSA record, communication between the servers will
cease and the email server will wait to send the
message at a later time. If a TLSA record does not
exist, opportunistic TLS is still used. The absence or

As mentioned, DANE for MTAs protects data-inmotion only.
It does nothing for end-user
authentication, digital signatures or data-at-rest
encryption. For this we must use S/MIME. But the
challenge has always been key management and
distribution.
Assume employees in two organizations,
purple.com and green.com need to communicate
with each other using confidential and authenticated
email. The employees have already obtained X.509
certificates. But how do personnel at either company
obtain access to the public certificates of employees
from the other company? There is no global public
repository or “certificate phone book”, where one can
easily look up this information. As we explain below,
however, DANE does provide just such a capability by
publishing records in the global DNS.
Internet draft [9] extends DANE by defining the
SMIMEA record. SMIMEA follows the same format as a
TLSA record, but is used to store X.509 certificate data
for individual users. The draft also defines a method to
convert an email address, john.doe@purple.com
into a domain name. The domain name uses a
truncated SHA-256 hash of the user name to provide
rudimentary privacy. The data stored in the SMIMEA
record could be a complete X.509 certificate or a
fingerprint. The DNS, secured by DNSSEC, is now a
trusted repository or an authentication method for end
user email certificates.
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Certificate Authority

Public key information
Learned through DANE

Public key information
Learned through DANE

DANE
Organization ”Green”

Organization ”Purple”
DNSSEC

Mail Server

Mail Server

Protected by “Purple’s” public key

Protected by “Green’s” public key

Email authentication: digitally signed email prevent phishing/forgery
Security from Mail server to Mail Server and Email User to Email User

Figure 2: DANE system showing certificate retrieval for MTA and end-users (source: NIST [27])
The process for end-user security is illustrated in
figure 2. A user at green.com digitally signs a
message with her private key. This is done directly in
the email client on her device. Next, in order to encrypt
the message, a query to the DNS is made to retrieve the
recipient’s public key certificate. This certificate is
cached by the user for future use and used to encrypt
the message. Using the public key certificate ensures
that only the recipient can decrypt the message.
Performing the operation in the recipient’s device
ensures data-at-rest confidentiality. The signed and
encrypted message is then transferred to the recipient
through another encryption layer at the MTA to MTA
level.
When the employee at purple.com receives the
message, it is decrypted on his device via his private
key. The user now needs to authenticate this message;
did it really come from the sender at green.com, or
is it a cleverly crafted spear phishing message? To
confirm authenticity, the email program must check the
veracity of the digital signature. This is done by
performing a DNS lookup of the sender’s public key
certificate. The public key is used to decrypt the
digital signature and perform a data integrity check. If
the signature validates correctly, the message is
authentic. It has not been altered in transit and the
originator has been confirmed.

3.4. Policy: DMARC applied to DANE
As described in section 2.2, DMARC defines policy
directives dictating the behavior of DKIM. It also
provides a feedback mechanism to report on actual

behavior. DANE can benefit from a similar
mechanism. To that end, a draft proposing DMARC
extensions for DANE [28] is currently a work-inprogress at the IETF. Sample policy directives include
• Receiver mail must be signed
• Receiver mail must be encrypted
• Sender mail must be signed
• Sender mail must be encrypted
Without these policies, users have to be attentive as
to whether a received email has been digitally signed,
typically indicated by an icon somewhere in the
message. These indicators are easy to miss. Unsigned
spear phishing messages without the icon could arrive
unnoticed and potentially be acted upon.
To build strong protection, an organization could
construct two inboxes for users. The “protected” inbox
would enforce strict policy dictating all incoming email
must be signed. The “unsafe” inbox accepts all mail,
signed or unsigned. Official company business would
be conducted within the protected mailbox. Other
business could still be handled in the unsafe mailbox,
but users now have the burden of checking for
signatures.
Feedback mechanisms are currently being defined,
but typically would report on various metrics such as
failure counts, etc.

3.5. Objections and Alternatives to DANE
While this paper advocates the usage of DANE,
there are several criticisms of the method. The Internet
blog articles [29, 30] discuss its dependency on
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DNSSEC and prompted many pro and con arguments.
It should be noted that [30] limits its discussion to
DANE for web site validation, as SMIMEA had not
yet been introduced.
A counter-proposal for securing MTA-to-MTA
communication has been proposed in a working draft
at the IETF [31] for SMTP Strict Transport Security
(STS). Like DANE, DKIM and DMARC, this protocol
also publishes records in the DNS, however STS does
not require DNSSEC. SMTP-STS is similar to STS for
web servers, but modified for relevancy to SMTP. It
works by having the receiving domain publish its
security policy at a well-defined URL, which a sender
accesses using HTTPS. Advantages are that it defines
policies and feedback reporting and does not mandate
the use of DNSSEC. Disadvantages are that it can be
spoofed or DDoSed (Distributed Denial of Service) to
make it appear that a policy is nonexistent. In addition,
sending MTAs must now use HTTPS to insure that a
secure channel exists. In contrast, DANE with
DNSSEC has secure responses and proof of
nonexistence built in.
STS is a trust mechanism for MTA to MTA only. It
does nothing for client certificates used for end-to-end
encryption and digital signing. SMIMEA remains as a
viable key distribution method.
Research on the robustness, security, resilience and
efficiency of DANE are only beginning at this time.
This is a topic for future development. Current pilot
programs are focusing on interoperability and core
features.

3.6. Deployments & Government Programs
DANE can be deployed today and multiple
organizations have already done so. The Internet
Society Deploy360 Programme has created a website
[32] listing some current deployments.
Of particular note is the trusted email showcase and
testbed at NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of
Excellence (NCCoE) [33]. The purpose of this NCCoE
project is to demonstrate interoperability among
commercially available DANE technologies from
various suppliers. The use and setup of these
technologies is being prepared to help government and
private enterprise deploy DANE on their own.
The testbed has several environments contributed
by Microsoft, Secure64, NLNetLabs, and ISC-Bind.
Each environment contains DNSSEC servers, email
servers, and email clients making use of DANE. Email
can be exchanged between the environments to
demonstrate interoperability in MTA-to-MTA security
as well as end-user security with DANE S/MIME.
NIST has also published an excellent reference
document to describe the principles and techniques

currently available for secure email: Trusted Email
(Special Publication SP-800-177) [27].
Other government involvement includes the drafting of
proposed mandates that require DANE. The German
government has published BSI TR-03108 Secure Email Transport [26], dated August 2015, requiring the
use of DANE.

4. Workflow Automation
DANE removes the biggest limitation to using
S/MIME on a global scale by creating a secure public
repository of email certificates. The other limitations
listed in section 2.1 still need to be addressed, as well
as methods to make DANE easier to use. There are
complexities in its use that begs for a more complete
and automated solution.
As an example, an organization could use DANE as
it exists today, however deployment would likely be
limited to a small scale. This is because TLSA and
SMIMEA records have to be manually generated and
maintained. Mistakes are easy to make. Managing a
trusted email environment will be difficult without
proper tools and processes.
The objectives for managing a trusted email
environment include the ability to automate DNS
provisioning, integrate company workflows, simplify
end-user activities, and manage company policy. To
that end, the following items are being developed or
already exist to assist DANE deployment and
operations:
• Automated DNS zone file provisioner for TLSA,
SMIMEA, SPF, DKIM and DMARC records.
• Automated DNSSEC signing appliances (e.g.
Secure64, OpenDNSSEC) or DNSSEC enabled
managed DNS services.
• Interfaces to Human Resource credential
databases (e.g. Active Directory, etc.)
• Means to acquire or generate X.509 certificates
either with an API to commercial CA accounts,
an enterprise local CA, or tools to generate selfsigned certificates.
• GUI objects and wizards to manage trust policies
expressed as DMARC and DMARC/DANE
records. Interfaces to legacy DMARC generation
systems.
• Mail servers with milters for handling DANE and
DMARC policy directives.
• Blacklist managers to block cousin domains.
• Integration with legacy email gateways and
DMARC data collectors / report generators (e.g.
Agari and others).
• Mobile Device Managers that provision personal
devices with X.509 certificates and interface to
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the DNS provisioner to exchange publishable
trust data.
• Key escrow as an option for organizations whose
policy requires that they have copies of enduser’s private keys.
• Logging and Auditing with interfaces to SIEM
systems.
A critical solution component is a DNS
Provisioning System. The basic function of DNS
record provisioning is to manage the workflow for
creation and maintenance of DNS records and zone
files. This task must be done with little or no manual
intervention. Software API’s link the provisioner to
other components such as employee databases (e.g.
Active Directory), mobile device managers (MDM),
and Certificate Authority APIs. The provisioner could
run locally or as a service in the cloud. The workflows
to be managed are:
• MTA management: Automate discovery of mail
servers and provisioning of TLSA, DKIM,
DMARC and SPF records. Dynamically
Maintain records due to external events such
as server changes or certificate expiration or
revocation. Interface with commercial
systems for DMARC feedback (e.g. Agari).
Software wizards and GUI objects would be
needed to assist in policy definition for DANE
and DKIM as well as interfaces to commercial
systems for this function.
• Employee Credential Management:
- Initial setup: Scrape the employee database to
create S/MIMEA records. Company policy
would dictate if private keys are owned by the
corporation or by the individual. If the
corporation owns the keys, certificates can be
generated by a central system. If the
individual owns the private keys, then only
the individual’s end user device should create
key-pairs and the provisioner device API or
MDM API will fetch this from user devices.
- Employee hire or termination: This is best
handled directly in the HR department
through an API. Credentials would be
established or revoked and the provisioning
system would update its local database and
DNS zone files on demand.
- Certificate renewal or revocation: Manage
the integration with HR databases, Certificate
Authorities, and MDM to end-user devices;
update records in the DNS.
Provisioning handles the supply side of certificate
publication. The retrieval side is also in need of
automation and simplification. Modern email clients
such as Outlook, Office 365, Apple Mail, and

Thunderbird have built-in encryption and digital
signature verification using S/MIME. What they do
not currently have is the ability to automatically
retrieve DANE-formatted public keys from the DNS as
mail is being composed and sent.
End-users should be able to use email with little or
no change to existing email usage. This requires
transparent integration of DANE into the end-user
devices and easier methods to install user credentials.
It is expected that vendors of mobile and PC-based
email clients will add this capability. In the temporary
absence of such systems, simple standalone
applications can fetch credentials from the DNS to
store public certificates in the end-user device. Plugins
to mailers such as Thunderbird have already been
developed to make this step automatic.

4.1. Incremental Deployment
These suggestions for automation and usability may
take some time to be fully realized. The authors wish to
emphasize, however, that the core elements to build a
DANE-enabled email system using manual steps is
immediately available. Additional functionality can be
implemented incrementally over time as new tools
become available. A possible sequence of events is as
follows:
1)

Manual provisioning of DANE records: Early
adopters are demonstrating the benefits of
DANE, but manual implementation is
impractical
for
the
wider
audience.
Nevertheless, scripts are currently available for
constructing TLSA and SMIMEA records and
these can be installed in an organization’s
authoritative DNS servers immediately.

2)

Manual retrieval of certificates: some
standalone apps and email client plugins are
available and more are under development.
These programs access email contact lists from
user devices to fetch email credentials and
insert them into the device’s keystore. These
tools require manual intervention by the user
rather than the more desirable goal of
transparent fetching of credentials within an
email client.

3)

Mail Filters (Milters) to automatically fetch
encryption certificates at the mail server.
SMILLA [34] is an existing example milter
that encrypts mail at the server instead of at the
sending email client. This provides a “90%
solution”; that is, it provides data-at-rest
protection at the end user device with messages
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uniquely encrypted for the recipient, but does
not perform encryption at the first mile
between the sending device and the mail
server. The solution is still useful, however,
since this first mile communication is typically
encrypted with TLS.
4)

Future automated provisioning of SMIMEA
records: organizations will be able to publish
their employee certificates more easily, but the
recipients of email will still have no client
applications (e.g. Thunderbird, Exchange,
Apple Mail) to automatically retrieve these
certificates.

components are under development; some already
exist.
Finally, the authors encourage supply chain
managers to reduce risk by protecting their email with
basic DANE technology as soon as possible.
Implementing DANE trusted email manually with the
existing infrastructure components is definitely
possible using published scripts and tools. The basic
functionality can then be expanded into a more robust,
automated, and easier to use solution for a more
general audience as additional tools become available.
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